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ABSTRACT 
Techniques are described herein for a threat protection mechanism for Vehicle-to-
Everything (V2X) communication channels. This includes shared intelligence at the Multi-
access Edge Computing (MEC) function, Security Intelligence Engine (SIE), Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) vendors, application providers, and external device 
vendors. It is capable of securing Vehicle User Entities (V-UEs) simultaneously in real 
time. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
One of the key requirements of 5G infrastructure for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) 
communication is threat protection. The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
of a Vehicle User Entity (V-UE) only provides network authentication but does not protect 
data from an external threat. Thus, V2X communication can be vulnerable to attacks. 
Accordingly, techniques are described herein for a Multi-access Edge Computing 
(MEC) based solution to protect vehicle data from threats and secure V2X communication. 
The solution maintains a database of threat related information (e.g., threat signatures) and 
synchronizes the policy information during vehicle on-boarding and other critical events. 
The solution may adapt to new threats and take appropriate actions based on 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP) standards, for example.  
Some of the critical vehicle data/commands which need to be protected include the 
vehicle On Board Diagnostic (OBD), infotainment Link Interconnect Network (LIN) 
information, Engine Control Unit (ECU) firmware upgrades, powertrain/battery 
information, body electronic module, vehicle telemetry (e.g., location), Diagnostic Trouble 
Codes (DTCs), V2X metadata, etc. 
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As per 3GPP standards, a V-UE may support eight different slices with a common 
Access Mobility Function (AMF) for all the slices and a Session Management Function 
(SMF) per slice. The network slice(s) use Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communication 
(URLLC) application(s) for V2X communication. The User Plane Function (UPF) is 
connected to the Mobile Edge Host (MEH).
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The Security Intelligence Engine (SIE) handles unknown requests from the MEC 
function and provides an interface for the OEMs / application providers / device vendors 
for registration and policy enforcement. This module also forwards unknown events that 
could not be resolved by the V-UE, MEC function, or SIE to respective vendors for further 
analysis and policy generation. It also classifies the threat based on applications, external 
devices, or OEMs, and identifies the owner of the entity under threat and shares the threat 
signature with the respective vendors.  
The MEC function deploys a V2X threat agent that handles requests from the V-
UE, forwards the request to the SIE (if the SIE previously failed to identify the threat), and 
broadcasts/multicasts any new policy identified by OEM/vendors. 
The Onboard Threat Analysis module performs local decision/policy enforcement 
and handles updates from the MEC function.
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The MSC has three phases with respect to the V-UE and 5G communications. The 
first phase involves V-UE registration and authentication. In this phase, the V-UE registers 
its presence in the 5G network and obtains a Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI) 
number. 
The second phase involves call setup. In this phase, the V-UE initiates the call as 
per 5G standards. During call establishment, the MEC function sends a session request to 
the SIE. The SIE may create a V-UE contest and send the response with a session identifier. 
The third phase involves vehicle onboarding and threat monitoring. In this phase, 
the V-UE sends its Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), RAN_ID, RAN_TYPE and 
GUTI to the MEC function. Based on the VIN, the MEC function identifies the vehicle 
type, model, and year, and sends the appropriate policy information to the V-UE.  
When there is an unauthorized/unknown request to access a vehicle resource, the 
following sequence of events may occur. Initially, the OEM/application providers/device 
vendors register with the SIE and push all known policies. Next, the V-UE obtains the 
request and checks the request locally based on the policy information. If the V-UE fails 
to identify the request, it sends a validation message to the MEC function to validate the 
request. 
The MEC function obtains the request from the V-UE and checks the corresponding 
policy. The MEC function responds to the UE with a grant indicating whether the request 
is accepted or denied. If the corresponding policy is not present on the MEC function, it 
sends a request to the SIE controller to validate the request. 
The SIE validates the request locally and sends the response back to the MEC 
function. If the SIE controller fails to identify the threat, it sends the notification to the 
OEM, application provider, or device vendor with the threat signature and additional 
information about the V-UE. Once the threat message from the SIE controller is received, 
the OEM/application provider/device vendor analyzes the request and takes appropriate 
action. For example, it may decide to accept/deny the request or push a new policy to the 
MEC function / V-UE or broadcast to all corresponding V-UEs.  
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Figure 3 below illustrates a high-level handover scenario between a 5G network, 
other networks, and out of network coverage areas. This diagram represents an aerial view 
of V2X handover. 
 
Figure 3 
The following sequence of events is for an autonomous car (V-UE) moving from 
location 1 to location 5. Initially, the car starts from location 1, and has access to a 5G 
network. If the car is powered on for the first time, the car registers its presence in the 
network. The car then obtains the threat policy from the MEC function. 
If the car proceeds to location 2, V-UE handoff from 5G to 4G occurs in accordance 
with standard handoff processes. Since the car has moved to a new RAN, the V-UE may 
repeat the three phases as discussed above in connection with Figure 2. At the first phase, 
it sends its VIN, Temporary IMSI (T-IMSI), new RAN_TYPE (4G), RAN_ID, and 
Primary Cell Identifier (PCI). At the third phase, the V-UE obtains the new policy.  
When the car moves to location 3, the car is out of the network coverage area. Based 
on the existing policy, the UE continuously monitors events occurring in the system. It 
rejects the request if the UE identifies the request as a threat. The car maintains an audit 
log for all allowed and denied events.  
When the car reaches location 4 (a new RAN 3G network), it pushes the audit log 
events to the MEC function after repeating the three phases. The MEC function evaluates 
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all the events and based on the new threat intelligence may push modified policies to all 
registered vehicles of same make/model. 
Some example of policies which may be pushed by the OEM / device vendors 
include: 
mec_policy_1 = {Event:Firmware_upgrade: Condition: RPM = 0 and Authorized 
Wi-Fi AP: {Action: Grant_Access} Else {Action: Access_Denied}; Notify_User, 
Audit_Event_log, etc.} 
mec_policy_2 = {Event:Web_Browser_Access_CAN_BUS: Condition: 
Any_Source : {Action: Access_Denied}; Notify_User, Audit_Event_log, etc.} 
...etc.  
 
At the MEC level, security policies of newly identified threats are automatically 
pushed across vendors. The MEC function has an intelligence to broadcast/multicast to all 
affected V-UEs. The SIE has the intelligence to redirect the threat signature to respective 
vendors. Infotainment/external peripheral vendors may enforce in real time the security 
polices which are pushed as the V-UE hands over across MEC functions. Policies may be 
pushed based on the capabilities of the cell area (e.g., 5G, Long Term Evolution (LTE), 
3G, etc.). 
In summary, techniques are described herein for a threat protection mechanism for 
V2X communication channels. A shared intelligence at the MEC function, SIE, OEM 
vendors, application providers, and external device vendors may improve the safety and 
security of multiple V-UEs simultaneously in real time. These techniques may thereby 
protect vehicles, drivers, and passengers from external attacks. 
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